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Iran's rearmament program has invited an array of interpretations of its current military
capability to close or interdict the Strait of Hormuz (SOH). The fighting in the Iran-Iraq War
(1980-1988), drove Iran's military forces down to minimal levels of equipment while
increasing institutional disorganization. Air and ground assets ended the war in the poorest
condition. Iran chose to rearm these forces first. However, in 1992, the focus widened to
include the rebuilding of the Navy and those military assets physically near the Strait of
Hormuz. This enlarged emphasis expanded Iranian military capacity to again challenge
shipping transiting the SOH. With its new naval acquisitions, Iran is an increased threat to the
interests of its neighbors and the West, particularly the United States. Initial reactions to this
threat from the United States include an increased military presence, economic sanctions, and
continued political rallying against the Islamic Republic. Simultaneously, the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) has reacted by implementing efforts to improve military strength through the
acquisition of weapons from the United States and others. A "spiraling effect" or arms race is
taking place between Iran and the GCC, in which each side attempts to gain military advantage
over the other. Unfortunately, the Iranian threat still persists. The growth of the Iranian forces,
specifically the navy and those components next to the SOH, have resulted in mixed threat
interpretations. Now, the ultimate challenge for decisionmakers and strategic planners alike
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This thesis undertakes an accurate assessment of Iran's military capability adjacent
to the Strait of Hormuz. Iran's rearmament program has invited a wide array of
interpretations on its precise military capability to close or interdict the Strait.
Specifically, above all strategic interests in the Persian Gulf, can Iran sustain an operation
to keep the Strait of Hormuz closed?
Iran continues to rebuild the Army and Air Forces in an ongoing initiative dating
back to 1988 In 1992, the focus of the rearming expanded to include the Navy and the
Naval Forces of the Islamic Republican Guard Corps. Conflicting reports suggest that this
rearmament is needed for coastal defense, while other sources view rearmament as one
factor of several objectives leading to the escalation of Iran as a regional power.
Whichever the case, Iran stands as a threat to its neighbors and the interests of the United
States.
Initial reactions to the military rebuilding have come from the United States,
though the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has reacted to the threat as well. The U.S.
has increased its military presence, economic sanctions, and unilateral and multilateral
political rallying against Iran. This paper, however, examines a 'military only"
perspective. This is justified by the fact that economic and political reactions are
important, but are not necessarily accurate in assessing a country's military capability.
IX
The GCC's governing council has attempted to implement efforts toward
developing and improving all facets of its military. These actions have enabled the GCC
to build-up a sizable force by acquiring conventional weapons from the United States and
abroad. These acquisitions to balance Iran have forced a 'Spiraling" between the two
entities. Though considerable arming has occurred among members of the GCC, the
Iranian threat of closure still exists. Despite its aggressive rearmament, and reactions by
the U.S. and the GCC, mixed views have surfaced whether Iran can or cannot close the
Strait.
B. KEY FINDINGS
Couple poor maintenance efforts with diminishing financial resources and the
result is a low proficiency level of operation. The proficiency level of a specific weapon
will drop if it is inoperative due to substandard maintenance or no financial support. This
effect will be exacerbated by a lack of at-sea training. The outcome: the crew is
prevented from retaining a proficiency level enabling them to operate the weapon to its full
capability.
Though Iran's many military exercises may showcase new or enhanced capabilities
for its forces, unproven is Iran's capability to sustain a closed Strait operation. Its
logistical capability, especially at sea, is questionable. To date, no evidence suggests Iran
can replenish underway, including refueling, vertical replenishment (VERTREP) or
underway replenishment (UNREP).
x
Iran possesses the capability to disrupt the flow of traffic through the Strait, but
for reasons described above, the country is incapable of keeping the Strait of Hormuz
closed against a credible counterforce.
Next, it is much easier to observe the independent reactions of the countries that
form the GCC than to observe the GCC as a whole. This is mainly due lack of
interoperability and cooperation, the result of ongoing territorial disputes between the
member states. A GCC force would require significant U.S. assistance to defend the
sovereignty of the regional countries and the interests of the United States. The GCC
requires many technological advances in weaponry to enable it to act as a sole entity. In
addition, the countries must learn to operate together and obtain a common
interoperability. The GCC is not a deterrent to Iran and is incapable of halting an
aggressive Iranian Navy.
The likelihood of Iran attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz is too costly an
operation on both the military and political scales, and most importantly on the economic
scale. Iran's greatest revenue derives from oil sales. The oil transits the Strait. If Iran
closes it, the one to be most painfully choked may be Iran itself.
In an attempt to assess the current Iranian threat, I have defined interdiction and
have introduced four tiers or threat levels of interdiction. The threat levels, Threat
Interdiction (TI), Harassment Interdiction (HI), Vital or Strategic Interdiction (VSI), and
Closure Operations Interdiction (COI) assist in identifying the current Iranian threat to
close the Strait of Hormuz.
XI
C. CONCLUSION
Iran is incapable of closing and sustaining a closed Strait of Hormuz against a
credible counterforce. The Islamic Republic has indulged in a very active weapons
proliferation program. Although this program is unrelenting, the requirements of
maintaining a highly qualified and proficient fleet or joint force have overwhelmed the
country. The current Iranian ability to interdict the Strait of Hormuz is classified at the
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By the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, Iran's military forces were at minimal
levels and in great disarray. Tank and armored vehicles numbered 750 and bore the
largests number of combat lost equipment. Furthermore, the Iranian Navy and the naval
force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) or Pasdaran Inqilab, suffered
heavy losses during the closing months of the war from numerous conflicts with a second
force, the United States Navy. Assigned the mission of escorting reflagged Kuwaiti oil
tankers, the U.S. Navy protected these vessels from Iranian gunboats. When the
rearmament initiative developed, Iran's air and ground forces were in the worst condition,
subsequently, the decision was made to rearm them first.
From 1989 to 1992, vast amounts of ground and air equipment were purchased.
However in 1992, there was a shift in the focus of rearmament efforts to include naval
assets. This widened focus brought a new threat to others in the region because Iran
obtained the capability to again challenge shipping transiting the Strait of Hormuz.
Rearming the naval force coincides with the ever increasing world-wide reliance on oil
from the Gulf region. One-third of the world's proven reserves are in the Gulf region.
The ultimate challenge for decisionmakers and planners alike lies in accurately
assessing the capability of Iranian forces to threaten or close the waterway. The questions
to be asked are: what would cause the Islamic Republic to close the Strait?; and just as
importantly, do they have the capability to actually initiate and sustain an operation of this
nature? This thesis addresses the latter question.
B. RESEARCH QUESTION
Given the rearmament program of Iran, is the current naval posture of the Iranians
capable of closing and sustaining a closed Strait ofHormuz? If so, to what degree?
C. COMPETING ARGUMENTS
After Iran's rearmament initiative, regional analysts suggested competing
arguments concerning which entity initiated the regional arms race. In November 1989,
Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Ahmed Besharati stated, "As the smaller countries
around us have armed themselves to the teeth and buy the most modern war material, we
too - as a big and vast country which has been the target of many threats throughout
history and especially during the decade of the Islamic revolution - will do the same." 1
This quote suggests that the Islamic Republic has emulated the actions of those around it,
or at least tries to justify its actions. This, however, may not necessarily be the case
because Iran has been at the forefront of rearming to a point beyond the other Persian Gulf
countries.
Between 1991 and 1993, another dispute raised concerns about weapons
proliferation within the region. This dispute suggests that the Gulf Cooperation Council
Shahram Chubin, Iran 's National Security Policy: Capabilities, Intentions & Impact
(Washington, DC: The Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 1994), 57.
(GCC) initiated a new arms race with the purchase of highly technical aircraft and armored
vehicles. Though this argument holds some credibility being as indicative of known
military arms purchases and deliveries, again, the Iranian Army and Air Force branches
received the heaviest losses during the war with Iraq, thus making the rearming of these
two branches a high priority. 3 I suggest that the 1991 to 1993 GCC build-up is a mere
reaction to Iran's rearming efforts of 1988 to 1991.
Another argument relates to Iran's capability to close the Strait of Hormuz. A
reporter suggested that the Islamic Republic can close the Strait based on the statements
of military leadership after one of their large-scale exercises. 4 In an Iranian television
interview, Major General Mohsen Rezaie, Commander of the IRGC, stated, "We can keep
the Strait of Hormuz open .
. . but if we want to, we shall close it to anyone who is an
obstacle to security in the region and keep it open for our friends and the Muslims.""
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research methodology for this thesis is an open source, literary review which
identifies the capabilities, limitations and ultimate purpose for the Iranian military build-up
2
Aaron Karp, "The Demise of the Middle East Arms Race," The Washington Quarterly
18, no. 4 (Autumn 1995): 40.
3
Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran & Iraq: The Threat From The Northern Gulf (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), 45-61.
4 Ed Blanche, "Iran able to close Strait of Hormuz, say general," Jane 's Defence Weekly
27, no. 18 (May 7, 1997): 18.
5
Ibid.
surrounding the Strait of Hormuz. The literature review consists of defense journals and
recent publications on net assessment. In addition, I have conducted interviews with
Middle East experts, professors of Middle Eastern military affairs, Department of Defense
and Department of State personnel. The goal was to collect sufficient data to assess the
Iranian naval threat. Furthermore, this methodology should answer the question on Iran's
capability to sustain a closed Strait.
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION
The intent of this thesis is to examine Iran's capability to close and sustain a closed
Strait of Hormuz. The focus is to remain on "What could they do?" rather than "What
would they do?" or "When would they do it?" Chapter I supports this thesis as the
introduction, while in Chapter II I review Iran's overall military capability. The emphasis
of Chapter II is on Iran's current military strength derived from an aggressive rearmament
program Specifically, this chapter describes the expansion in Iran's rearmament strategy.
The end result is a clearer presentation of the precise force structure of Iran's capability.
In addition, this chapter addresses the question concerning Iran's ability to close the Strait
of Hormuz.
Chapter III focuses on the U.S. and GCC reactions toward Iran's growing military
and perceived threat. The Gulf states include Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, the
United Arab Emirates and Kuwait. I record those military reactions in the form of
strengths, acquisitions, military presence, combined military operations and renewed
military alliances. Most importantly, this chapter identifies regional military reactions by
both the U.S. and the GCC. A "military only" view is justified because the political and
economic variables, though important, do not necessarily represent the growing
seriousness of the Iranian threat, especially when the country is capable of initiating
hostilities. The intent of this chapter is to describe the trends of weapons proliferation
taking place in the Persian Gulf, and the capability of the GCC to provide its own regional
security.
In Chapter IV, I define interdiction and introduce varying levels of interdiction.
This chapter is critically important because it places the military analysis of Chapter II into
an interdiction level relevant to Iran's capabilities to disrupt traffic flow through the Strait
of Hormuz. This further answers the prevailing question of whether Iran actually
possesses the capability to sustain a closed Strait of Hormuz. The final chapter of this
thesis, Chapter V, will present my conclusions.

II. THE IRANIAN THREAT ALONG
THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ
A. OVERVIEW
This chapter highlights Iran's rearmament initiative, specifically rearmament efforts
with those assets which Iran utilizes during joint exercises and routine patrols in the
Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman. This has led experts to suggest
that the aim of the exercises are to prepare for future hostilities.
Organized into four parts, the next section examines the rearmament program and
a comparison of forces for the years of 1988 and 1996. This comparison showcases the
growth of military forces, and pays particular attention to the Islamic Navy and the naval
branch of the Revolutionary Guard (IRGCN). The Kilo class submarine and follow-on
naval acquisitions were made to support or work in unison with the other military
branches of the Iranian forces. These components alone present the most dominant threat
to merchant and naval vessels alike.
Included in this chapter is a critical assessment of those naval and joint force
elements which are intended for ship interdiction. Next is the identification of trends in
naval operations, ranging from the cohesion and operation of integrated units to the
"muscle flexing" test firing of missiles and continuous naval displays of power projection.
The last section of this chapter is a critical assessment of the Iranian forces adjacent to the
Strait of Hormuz.
B. IRAN'S MILITARY BUILD-UP AND THE ENLARGEMENT OF FOCUS
TOWARDS NAVAL ASSETS
The Iranian rearming initiative is unique in that it is the first time since the
Revolution of 1979 that the Islamic Republic could concentrate on rearming without
actually being at war.
6
Shortly after the United Nations Security Council's Resolution 598
on July 18, 1988, which called for a ceasefire between Iran and Iraq, and a full withdrawal
of military forces to their national borders, the Iranian forces were in disarray and in need
of rejuvenation. Numerous objectives were laid out for restructuring, of which rearming
was a single entity in repositioning Iran as a regional power. The Army and Air Force
received the greatest losses, and therefore early on required the highest priority in defense
rebuilding. However, I suggest that the focus of the build-up widened from those two
forces to include the Navy and those assets which could be used to interdict the Strait of
Hormuz. Though the Iranian government has denied claims of a weapons build-up along
the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz, 8 this new focus reveals Iran's potential capability to
one day influence Gulf shipping traffic. A contrary view argues that Iran's interest lies in
Dr. Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "The Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran,"
Jane 's Intelligence Review 5, no. 2 (February 1993): 76.
Other objectives included the preservation of internal security, maintenance of territorial
security, and the elimination of the U.S. threat. See Chubin, "Iran's Strategic Aims and
Constraints," Iran 's Military Intentions And Capabilities, 69-70.
John Prescott, "Iran denies claims of weapons build-up," Reuters Textline (March 24
1995).
maintaining the free flow of oil through the Persian Gulf and not impeding it.
9
Table 2-1
below is a comparison of conventional forces using the years 1988 and 1996, which
represent the start of the new build-up and progress thus far.
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Patrol & Coastal Combatants
Corvettes 2
Missile Craft 10 20
Patrol, Inshore 24 26
Mine Countermeasures 3 7
Amphibious 7 8















HELO 53 (unarmed) 46 (unarmed)
TRG (Fixed Wing) 85 1 18 (30 quick conversion)
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AAM unknown AIM-7 Sparrow, AIM-9
Sidewinder, AIM-54
Phoenix, AA-8, AA-10,
AA-1 1 for MiG-29, PL-7
SAM 5 sqn with 30 Rapier-, 25
Tigercat, 50 HQ-2J
12 bn with 150 1HAWK, 5
sqn with 30 Rapier, 15
Tigercat, 45 HQ-2J (PRC
version of SA-2), SA-5,
FM-80 (PRC version of
Crotale)
Forces Abroad
Lebanon 2,000 Revolutionary Guard 150 Revolutionary Guard
Sudan — Military Advisors
Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance, 1989/90 (London:
IISS, 1989); The Military Balance, 1996/97 (London: IISS, 1996); Office of The Secretary of Defense,
Proliferation: Threat and Response (April 1996): 16.
Iran began its current chemical weapons program as the result of Iraq's use of
mustard gas in 1983 against Iranian troops. Iran developed and later in the war used
several chemical agents against the Iraqis. Estimates on the exact amount of chemical
agents currently stockpiled by Iran reach up to 2,000 tons. There also appears to be a
substantial stockpile on the Iranian island of Abu Musa in the Straits. All of this activity
11
appears to continue despite the fact that Iran is a signator of the 1993 Chemical Weapons
Convention. 10
According to Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes, USA, Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency, "Iran has maintained an offensive Biological Weapons (BW)
program since the mid-1980s." 11 Evidence does confirm that the required technical
knowledge and infrastructure needed for BW weapons is in place. 12 Iran's proliferation of
dual-use equipment for agents, research, and development has aided in the process of
manufacturing biological weapons. General Hughes further claims, "Iran's BW program
has the momentum to mature into a weapons capability and to pose a regional threat. . . ."
Iran has always claimed to have pursued nuclear capabilities for energy purposes
from the inception of the nuclear program begun under the Shah. 14 Today, published
reports have surfaced stating that "Iran has initiated civilian and weapons-related nuclear
efforts despite having signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons."
10
SIPRI, 1996, 664.
Congress, Senate, Select Committe on Intelligence, Current And Projected National
Security Threats To The United States And Its Interests Abroad: Hearing before the






Former head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), correspondence with
author, 29 May 1997.
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat And Response (Washington,
DC: U.S. GPO, 1996): 14.
12
Iran has sought advanced technology in the form of a plutonium reactor from
China. Currently, the technical and scientific base is insufficient to support a major
nuclear program and "... at the present time, the threat posed by the Iranian CW/BW
program is far more immediate than that posed by the country's nuclear activities." 17 In
essence, if Iran is attempting to build a nuclear arsenal, it is still a long way from achieving
that goal.
1. Weapons for Interdiction
a. Conventional
The weapons of interest that enhance Iran's military capability near the
SOH fall in two categories, conventional and non-conventional. In the conventional area,
Iran has made significant efforts to rebuild its Navy. The most significant acquisition and
immediate threat to Western naval forces began with the delivery of one Russian Kilo
Class (SS) diesel-electric submarine in 1992, the Tariq 901. Widely publicized is the fact
that Iran has taken additional delivery of two more subs, the Noor 902 and Yimes 903, and
has exercised these crafts in interdiction type operations within the region. Though these
submarines have taken part in major exercises, the question surrounding the critical impact
16
Ibid., 12-16; See also, Shai Feldman, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the
Middle East (Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press, 1997), 47-53.
Leonard Spector, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Testimony to the Congressional Affairs Committee, Hearing on Current and Projected
National Security Threats to the United States and Its Interests Abroad, Select Committee
on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, February 22, 1996.
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of these components relates to the quality of maintenance rendered and the proficiency
with which they are operated. The first two units have suffered from battery problems,
which further diminishes at-sea time for the crews. The result is that crew proficiency
drops. Despite setbacks in material readiness and crew proficiency, one report contends
that the Iranians have worked to overcome these burdens. 18 In another report, a
Congressional Research Fellow stated, "The Iranians have surprised us by learning how to
operate their submarines better and more quickly than we anticipated... That means we
will have to be concerned about them." 19 This narrows the focus of capability to the type
of mission most likely to be conducted by Iranian submarines.
Numerous accounts have been published in open sources which suggest the
possibility of submarine missions; however, none conclusive Regardless of the tasking,
whether it is ship interdiction, special operations, or surface surveillance to name a few,
precise observation must be given to the entire capability that this platform brings to the
regional waters. For example, the Kilos can carry wake-homing and acoustic torpedoes,
1 Q
Congress, Senate, Worldwide Submarine Challenges, Statement of Rear Admiral
Michael W. Cramer, Director of Naval Intelligence, Before The Subcommittee On
Seapower Of The Senate Armed Services Committee, 8 April 1997; The burdens range
from inoperative batteries to poor maintenance practices. Some training and battery
cooling problems are being resolved with the assistance of India. Richard Sharpe, ed.,
Jane's Fighting Ships: 1995-96 (London: International Thomson Publishing Company,
1995), 319.
Jonathan Landay, "The Arms Race Under the Sea: Subs Surface As Weapon Of Choice
In Bids For Power," Christian Science Monitor (September 27, 1997).
14
and, also, vary the total loadout with the addition of mines.
20
Figure 2-1 denotes possible
operational areas for the submarines and potential minefields. "The acquisition of these
submarines is an important element of Iran's declared goal of controlling the Strait of
Hormuz and consolidated naval superiority in the Persian Gulf" 21
I suggest the most likely mission for the Iranian Kilos will be in mining
operations for two reasons. The first relates to economic feasibility. Mining key
waterways within the Strait of Hormuz or Gulf of Oman is inexpensive and can be done
without risking detection. Secondly, Iran's purchase of the Kilos included the purchase of
as many as 1,800 mines. 22 Speculation here suggests that the mines are deployable from
torpedo tubes.
Ibid., The Kilo has six 53 mm (21 in) diameter tubes which can fire a combination of
wire-guided active/passive homing to 15 km (8. 1 nm) at 40 kts. The warhead weighs 205
kg. The submarine is also capable of firing a passive wake homing torpedo to 25 km (13.5
nm) at 50 kts with a warhead weight of 300 kg. Total loadout for the submarine is 18
warheads. The vessels can carry up to 36 mines, two mines in lieu of one torpedo; John
Jordan, "The 'Kilo' Class Submarine," Jane 's Intelligence Review 4, no. 9 (September
1992): 427.
21
Statement of Rear Admiral Michael W. Cramer, Director of Naval Intelligence, Before
The Subcommittee On Seapower Of The Senate Armed Services Committee, 8 April
1997.
2 James Kraska, "Iran Flexes Maritime Muscles in Gulf," Defense News (October 4,
1993): 25.
15





Figure courtesy of the Office of Naval Intelligence.
In addition to the Kilo operations, Iran has conducted special operations
with three known miniature submarines. In the past these mini-units, one supplied by
North Korea, another by Germany, and one produced indigenously, have supported a
variety of missions, including amphibious assaults, sneak attacks, and mine laying
operations.
Besides mine laying and delivery, Iran has focused efforts on other facets of
mine warfare. In the inventory of older mines, there are at least 3,000 mines including
moored and drifting contact mines. 23 Deployment of the weapons is rogue in nature, that
23
Richard Sharpe, ed., Jane's Fighting Ships: 1997-98 (London: Janes's Information
Group, 1997), 317.
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is, no specially equipped vessels are used or needed to lay the mines. Besides using
submarines, the Iranians are capable of using small craft, civilian "vessels for hire,"
Landing Ships (LSTs), Boghammers, and helicopters. Unconfirmed reports also suggest
that Iran has acquired Chinese made EM-52 rocket-propelled mines. This capability now
enables Iran to mine the Strait's strong currents. The EM-52 mines are unique in
operation The latest version sits on the bottom of a waterway, senses a ship passing
overhead, and then fires a rocket to hit the target. Additionally, the mine can be set to
attack after a given number of ships have transited. Open sources do not give the exact
operating depths of these mines. A mine warfare capability consisting of older rogue
mines and new EM-52s enables Iran to now deploy these weapons effectively anywhere in
the Gulf region.
Though the mines will be an important obstacle for Western navies to
overcome, Iran's missile inventory is another hurdle for its enemies. Included in the
missile inventory are surface-to-surface missiles (SSM), surface-to-air missiles (SAM),
and air-to-surface missiles.
The first type of weapons discussed are the SSMs. One danger to the U.S.
military is the HY-2 Silkworm missile. Produced by the Republic of China, this missile
has an 80-90 kilometer range and is capable of carrying a 450 kilogram payload. Within
the IRGC, five operational land-based sites exist. However, given the age of the weapon
and the systems, analysts speculate on problems concerning maintenance, reliability and
readiness in general.
17
Other types of SSMs are the CS-801 Ying Jai and CS-802 Saccade
missiles. Both are supplied by China. The CS-801 missile has a range of 74 kilometers.
It is believed that the Iranian arsenal has grown in size to an excess of 100 missiles. Used
for anti-ship combat operations, the missile can be launched from air, land, or sea
platforms. This weapon is somewhat outdated and has been surpassed by the production
of the CS-802.
The CS-802 is an upgraded version of its predecessor and was test fired in
Iran on November 28, 1995, and again in January 1996. This displays a new ability to
threaten shipping within the Strait of Hormuz. The missile has an estimated range of 95
kilometers with a warhead in excess of 165 kilograms. 24 Most importantly, Iran's new
Hudong class ship is armed with the upgrade. These otherwise mainly land-based missiles
are controlled by the Revolutionary Guard and now when used in the Hudong class vessel
are capable of covering the Northern Persian Gulf.
One additional threat to U.S. ships is the SS-N-22 Sunburn or Sunburst
missile. This surface-to-surface, sea skimming weapon is compliments of Ukraine. It is
said that the missile has been deployed near the Strait of Hormuz and has a range of up to
120 kilometers. It is believed that the number of missiles acquired ranges from 8 to 12.
This system is much more sophisticated than the CS-80 1/802 missiles, particularly in its
guidance technology. In addition, the missile is harder to intercept, and some experts
Barbara Starr, "Iran adds new threat with cruise missile test," Jane 's Defense Weekly
25, no. 6 (February 7, 1996): 14.
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believe it is designed to defeat U.S. Aegis class ships. 25 In all, the missiles are tactically
deployed along the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz, on islands inside the Persian Gulf, and
sparingly deployed on surface units.
Similar to the purchase of more sophisticated surface-to-surface missiles,
Iran has pursued advanced surface-to-air weaponry. Iran has nine or more long-range
SAM sites equipped with (I)HAWK, SA-5, and SA-6 missiles on the mainland and
islands in the Gulf, compared to three shorter range HAWK-equipped sites in the early
1990s. Iran's acquisition of the SA-5 extends the range of air defense measures well into
the Persian Gulf
Iran does posses an increased capability to strike from airborne platforms
during anti-surface warfare (ASUW) operations. The first platform is the Russian or ex-
Iraqi Su-24 Fencer. The airframe can carry a wide array of weapons for use in tactical
anti-ship roles. One report indicates that Iran is desperately trying to reconfigure its aging
U.S. supplied, F-4 Phantoms 26 If successful, the CS-801 could be launched from the
Phantom. As for rotary-wing capabilities, the AB-212 helicopter can fire a French built
AS- 12 missile originally designed for anti-tank use. The Iranians have transposed this
5
Anthony H. Cordesman and Ahmed S. Hashim, Iran: Dilemmas of Dual Containment
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview press, 1997), 255.
26 Tom Chamberlain, "Naval Forces and The Persian Gulf Challenges," Surface Warfare
22, no. 2 (March/April 1997): 4.
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into an anti-ship weapon, but the test results of this attempted cross-over show the
weapon to be ineffective. 27
Perhaps a key ingredient to improve Iran's fledgling fleet is the acquisition
often Hudong PTGs from China. The Hudongs are fitted with the new CS-802 missile,
thereby increasing the lethality of the navy. These vessels compliment an already aged
fleet which includes two ex-U.S. Sumner class destroyers and ten Combatante IIB PTGs.
Similar to the Hudong class, some Combatante class ships have received back fitting for
the CS-802 as well. These upgrades have expanded naval capability at a somewhat low
cost. Inside the IRGCN, hundreds of small speedboats and dozens of Boghammers craft
are still available for use. The only shortfall for our calculations is the exact number of
operational units that exist at this level.
The above weapons capabilities showcase the important aspects of Iran's
arming in the region of the Strait of Hormuz. These weapons, though small in total
numbers, do provide the capability to interdict the strategic waterway. How well the
Iranians use these weapons and maintain them along with maintaining proficiency is
discussed later.
b. Non-conventional
The only non-conventional weapons in existence within the Strait of




facilities are on the island of Abu Musa, located inside the mouth of the Persian Gulf. Abu
Musa is tactically suited by its position near the shipping lanes. This does not preclude
storage facilities in ports or other mainland facilities, though; the point here is to highlight
the lethal threat
In March 1995, United States Secretary of Defense Perry accused Iran of
deploying chemical weapons on strategically located islands. 28 While touring the Persian
Gulf promoting joint cooperation, the Secretary touched upon the "substantial buildup of
military forces on the islands of the Strait of Hormuz."" The forces include anti-ship
missiles, air-defense missiles, and chemical weapons. He further stated that, "It is a
deployment that is far beyond any reasonable defensive requirements that Iran has, and it
can only be regarded ... as a potential threat to shipping in the area ."' These statements
made by Secretary Perry are only the first steps on the evidence trail.
Shortly following Secretary Perry's comments, the Iranian news service,
Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), quoted Foreign Ministry spokesman Morteza
Sarmadi, who denounced Perry's claims and denied any chemical storage facility.
8
"US Accuses Iran of deploying chemical weapons on coast," Agence France Presse
(March 22, 1995); "US scaring Gulf Nations to sell them weapons, Iran says," Agence
France Presse (March 23, 1995).
29




John Prescott, "Iran denies claims of weapons build-up," Reuters Textline (March 24
1995).
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Though explicitly denying any build-up of chemical weapons close to the Strait of
Hormuz, the government official did not deny the existence of other unconventional
weapons.
The final piece of evidence that suggests chemical weapons exist on Abu
Musa. A report featuring the Iranian threat specific to the Strait of Hormuz was aired by
the Christian Broadcasting Network on December 16, 1996. 32 From satellite imagery, the
report further identified possible chemical storage facilities, SSM, and SAM embankments.
This evidence alone supports Iran's capability to interdict the waterway and strongly
suggest that chemicals stored on the islands may be one tool of choice. The advent of a
chemical capability suggests a new method of disrupting transiting vessels in the Strait of
Hormuz.
2. Strategic Positioning
Occupation of the Gulf islands without a doubt nurtures Iran's longing for
hegemony in the Persian Gulf region. 33 Three islands located to the west of the Strait of
David Snyder, "Threats To America," Christian Broadcasting Network (December
1996).
In addition to becoming a dominant power in the region, another security goal relates to
the security of fundamental interests via increased military capabilities to counter potential
invasions by the more capable militaries of Iraq, Turkey, Russia, and Pakistan. Islamist
goals include: (1) spreading the Islamist Revolution; (2) elimination of American/Western
influence in the Gulf region; and (3) disrupting the Arab-Israeli peace process. For a
detailed perspective on Iran's goals see Graham E. Fuller and Bruce R. Pirnie, Iran:
Destabilizing Potential in the Persian Gulf (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1996), 3-
10; Sharam Chubin, "Iran's Military Intentions And Capabilities," in Patrick Clawson, ed.,
Iran's Strategic Intentions And Capabilities (Washington, DC: National Defense
University, 1994), 66-70; Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran and Iraq: The Threat from the
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Hormuz serve a strategic purpose. These islands, Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser
Tunb, are important to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Their location gives Iran an excellent strategic position adjacent to shipping lanes,
and any inland targets on the western Persian Gulf. In addition, Iran can defend itself
more appropriately on the homefront with radar sites and other defensive measures
positioned on the islands.
Both Iran and the UAE have laid claims to Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and Lesser
Tunb. When discussing the claims, however, it is easy to fall into several legalities. On
one hand, Iran feels it had the right to the islands because it exerted at least indirect
control over Abu Musa and the Tunbs before Britain seized control of the islands in 1887.
On the other, the UAE feels it has the right to the islands because Iran has not exerted
meaningful control over the Tunbs in modern times, even when under the control of the
ruling family in Ras al-Khaimah. One additional UAE argument refers to Abu Musa,
having been under the control of the ruling Arab family in Sharjah; branches lived in both
Iran and the UAE, but the main branch was in Sharjah
Throughout history, the island of Abu Musa has been seized by a variety of parties,
but most recently and specific to the discussion was the period of April 25 to May 4,
Northern Gulf (San Francisco, California: Westview Press, 1994), 28-35; and Bruce
Nardulli, Marcy Agmon, Theodore Karasik, Joseph A. Kechichian, Mary E. Morris,
Nikola B. Schahgaldiann and Lory Arghavan, Future Gulf Dynamics and U.S. Security
(Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1994), 29-30.
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1992. During this time Iran reasserted control of Abu Musa. 34 The obvious question is
why? Reports suggest Iran claimed it had not received a fair share of off-shore oil
production from the island of Abu Musa. The Iranian media got involved and referred to
the island as Iranian territory.
35
Iran then expelled workers that had UAE visas, and again
claimed sovereignty. This seizure operation was run in conjunction with a massive joint
exercise including 45 ships, 105 small crafts, and air support. 36 This array of power gives
Iran a strong embankment in the Straits of Hormuz.
Following the Iranian seizure, the UAE proposed to lease the islands to Iran along
with additional stipulations, with hopes of solving the sovereignty problem, and to alter
the sharing of oil in favor of Iran. Those stipulations said that: 37 (1) Iran should bring an
end to its military occupation of the Lesser and Greater Tunbs; (2) Iran should confirm its
commitment to the Memorandum of Understanding of 1971 with regard to the island of
Abu Musa; (3) Iran should refrain from interference under any circumstances whatsoever
in the exercise by the UAE of its sovereign power over that part of the island (Abu Musa)
designated to it under the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding; (4) Iran should
For complete details see Helen Chapin Metz, ed., Persian Gulf States: Country Studies
(Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1994), 248-249.
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Derived from the Government Political System, "The Three UAE Islands," Lexis-
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cancel all arrangements and undertakings which adversely affect UAE nationals, non-UAE
residents, and the state's institutions on the island of Abu Musa; and (5) both sides should
work together to create a suitable framework for settling the question of the sovereignty
of the island of Abu Musa within a fixed period of time. The proposal and all stipulations
were rejected by Iran. The UAE then went to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and
to the Arab League for assistance. This move and effort by the UAE came to no avail.
Though the UAE displayed a willingness to negotiate a settlement, Iran saw no
requirement to negotiate over territory which it believed was rightfully its own. On
September 28, 1992, Iran broke off talks and later charged that the GCC and UAE had
become plotters for the United States. President Rafsanjani declared the issue a U.S.
"conspiracy ... to justify its illegitimate presence in the Persian Gulf."" Today, both sides
remain divided. 39 The UAE has referred this matter to the United Nations Security
Council and the International Court of Justice. Iran reacted by expanding its military
presence on the islands.
Subsequently, the Qatar government became involved and suggested a meeting of
experts. This initiative was announced on November 18, 1995. Stipulations identical to
the 1992 discussions ultimately caused the failure of this initiative.
With Iran's refusal to negotiate, and its increased military presence on the islands,
one may ask, "What is the significance of these Persian Gulf islands?" On a regional level,
38 Cordesman and Hashim, Iran: Dilemmas ofDual Containment, 132.
39
"Iran reasserts claim to disputed islands," Reuters News Service (January 10, 1995).
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the actions taken by Iran were part of its goal to reestablish itself as a regional power.
Additionally, Iran was showing its Persian Gulf neighbors that it will take back and keep
what it believes is rightfully its own.
Domestically, retaking the islands and refusing to negotiate over the right of
ownership shows Iranians that the nation is strong. This nationalistic behavior is a move
toward a more positive and rejuvenated society. Further, with such actions, Iran does not
have to fear retaliatory strikes from the smaller UAE, or the GCC for that matter. There
is enough nationalistic rallying inside the country of Iran to deter its Persian Gulf
neighbors from any attempts to seize the island. In essence, Iran can afford to remain in a
nationalistic mode of operation.
Economically, the three islands are sometimes used as stopovers or transfer areas
when conducting trade with the UAE. Dubai, for instance, is Iran's largest trading partner
in the Persian Gulf. Dubai has a large number of Iranians and former Iranians, and
reshipping to Iran is a major industry. The country exported $681 million to Iran within
the first nine months of 1995. 40
Strategic significance is the most important reason Iran is claiming and protecting
the islands. Several reasons support this argument. First and foremost is the location of
the islands. One-third of the world's oil passes through this waterway everyday. This is a
useful bargaining chip should hostilities ever breakout between Iran and some intervening
government. Second, the locations of the islands increases defensive capabilities because
Cordesman and Hashim, Iran: Dilemmas ofDual Containment, 134
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of the wider array of radar nets, air and surface missile envelopes, and the capability to
deploy and launch at any given target in the Persian Gulf 41
Being able to interdict the shipping lanes leading in/out of the Persian Gulf is easy.
The channel runs 10-15 kilometers on either side of the Tunbs. Furthermore, the Iranian
side of the midpoint is not within the 12 mile limit. Abu Musa's location is 40 kilometers
south of Lesser Tunb and 25 kilometers west of the east bound tanker channel. The
Tunbs extend Iran's ability to threaten tanker channels, while Abu Musa ensures that the
tankers cannot shift south without passing an Iranian island.
Estimates vary for the amount of troops on the islands, but the best guess is nearly
4,000 for all of the islands combined. Dug into Abu Musa are 10 old M-48 tanks and 155
mm howitzers. 4 Most importantly, there are missile sites on all of the islands.
HAWK missile launchers (anti-air) are the primary air defensive weapons on the
islands. The surface threat to shipping traffic derives from the improved HY-2 Silkworm
missile which has a 90 kilometer range. Some reports suggest storage of chemical
weapons on two of the islands. Additionally, the armaments of the three islands discussed
in this paper are minor compared to the establishments on the Iranian islands of Forur,
41
Contrary to American observations, Iran has denied weapon build-ups. See Prescott,
"Iran denies claims of weapons build-up," (March 24, 1995).
42 The 155 mm is capable of firing munitions loaded with chemical agents. Ian O. Lesser,
and Ashley J. Tellis, Strategic Exposure: Proliferation Around the Mediterranean (Santa
Monica, California: Rand, 1996), 100.
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Sirri, Qeshem, Hengam, and Larak. Each of these islands has a wide assortment of both
offensive and defensive weapons. However, the main issue of this section is not the
military capabilities of the Iranian forces, but the interdiction capacity Iran has due to its
presence on the islands.
The long, drawn-out disputes and island claims will continue into the future.
Further, I suggest that it is the location of these islands which has mesmerized the Iranian
leadership into "needing" the territory. The islands are strategically located in a vital
waterway filled with supertankers and sometimes naval war vessels. Having a capability
to interdict these channels lends clout to any threat of Iranian hostility.
C. TRENDS IN NAVAL OPERATIONS
My comments on the latest trends are derived from observations of Iran's training
during recent major exercises. Over the past years, Iran has increased the number of
exercises.
44
During a recent operation, Iran flexed its muscles by test firing several CS-
802 missiles from combat ship launchers. Though launched during an exercise, given the
location, I suggest that the explicit nature of these firings further displays to the
international community that Iran is seeking to control the Strait of Hormuz in the future.
Iran conducted 36 exercises in 1993, 49 exercises in 1994, 57 exercises in 1995, and 38
exercises in 1996. More exercises are expected in 1997. Improvements were observed in
missile deployments, joint cooperation, mine warfare and underwater training. See
"Amphibious forces tested," Jane's Defence Weekly 24, no. 14 (October 7, 1995): 22;
James Bruce, "Navy steps up exercises in gateway to the Gulf," Jane 's Defence Weekly
24, no. 17 (October 25, 1995): 19; and "Iran steps up Gulf Exercises," Jane's Defence
Weekly (January 1, 1996): 12.
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The exercises are now fully integrated, including all components of the Iranian
armed forces. For instance, the Air Force has used fighter attack aircraft against shipping
and air defense units, while the Army has positioned tanks and artillery units within miles
of the waterway for coordinated shipping attacks. The Navy has conducted small craft
raids using the new Hudong class attack vessel, submarine maneuvers and mining
operations. Additionally, naval forces have closely integrated with the IRGCN in
amphibious landings and special operations.
Attempts at improving the quality of maintenance range from packages purchased
at the time of acquisition, to seeking outside assistance in solving technical problems on
sophisticated weaponry. Indian technicians have collaborated with Russian experts in
solving the submarines' battery problems. Further, North Korea has given technology to
Iran for building missiles. In the non-conventional arena, Russia and China have assisted
Iran with nuclear reactors which are claimed to be for peaceful purposes. We can
conclude from these actions that Iran is seeking the best weaponry available from the
international community.
Finally, that last trend noted in the analysis of Iran's military actions is the increase
in power projection. Acquiring new weapons and then displaying these weapons through
routine patrols and exercises sends explicit signals to the regional members that Iran is
longing for power. Iran is capable of defeating a unified GCC for various reasons,
described in Chapter III. This power projection often enhances the threat the Islamic
Republic brings to the region.
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D. ANALYSIS
The Islamic Republic of Iran has strived to enhance the overall capability of those
forces adjacent the Strait of Hormuz, with the acquisition of submarines, surface
combatants, and technologically advanced missile systems including air and surface
defense missiles. The number of weapons alone does not allow an accurate estimate of the
real capability of the Iranian forces. Consideration must be given to maintenance
practices, financial resources, proficiency levels, and sustainment requirements.
Iran, not unlike other Third-World or developing countries, has had a long history
of uneven and poor maintenance practices. Iran has purchased expensive arms only to
have them subdued by poor maintenance programs. Using the Iran-Iraq War as a case
study, I suggest the maintenance practices on the new weapons are substandard. I view
the proliferation of high tech weapons as a short term concession to military needs due to
the lack of a quality maintenance program. Until better maintenance practices are
incorporated, the life expectancy of the acquired armaments will never be fulfilled.
The reasons for poor maintenance are varied,45 but perhaps the single most
important factor is a lack of funding for spare parts and training. The economic resources
dedicated to the the military have significantly decreased since the start of rearmament. In
1989, the Iranian defense budget totaled $10 billion (U.S.). As of 1996, the budget has
Lack of training, make-shift tooling for technologically advanced weapons, and
substandard quality control to cite a few.
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decreased to $3.4 billion (U.S.). 46 Various reasons could be argued here, but the main
point is that the country is still acquiring advanced weaponry on an increasingly tightened
budget. Further, Iran has sought to employ another initiative through trading oil for arms
with some countries, to supplement its hard currency. Often, these countries do not have
the spare parts or training necessary to address Iranian maintenance needs.
47
.
Couple poor maintenance with low financial resources and the result is a low
proficiency level of operation regardless of the weaponry. The proficiency level of a
specific weapon will drop if it is inoperative due to a lack of maintenance or insufficient
financial support. For example, it is well known that the Iranian submarines are
experiencing trouble with their batteries The batteries allow a submarine to operate at
low detection levels. Unable to correct the problem indigenously, the country opted to
request Indian assistance. Until the problem was fixed, the submarines were unable to get
underway. Without being at sea for any duration of time, the crew cannot establish or
retain a proficiency level capable of operating the weapon or platform at its full potential.
Sustaining operations is another critical element in determining Iran's capability to
close the Strait of Hormuz. No evidence exists which suggests that the Iranians can
sustain any closure operations of the Strait of Hormuz. Though the exercises may
showcase a new or enhanced capability for the Iranian forces, still to be proven is the fact
46
International Institue for Strategic Studies (II SS), The Military Balance 1989-1990,
(London: IISS, 1989), 99. All versions up to the 1995-1996 publication are utilized.
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Biggest recipient of this initiative are countries in the Far East.
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that the country can sustain a closed Strait operation. Its logistical capability, especially at
sea, is questionable To date, it remains a mystery whether Iran can replenish any
underway vessels, including refueling, vertical replenishment (VERTREP), or underway
replenishment (UNREP). This point is important in determining the exact overall
capability of Iran, and its capacity to close the Strait of Hormuz.
Iran possesses the capability to disrupt the flow of traffic through the Strait, but
for military reasons described above, Iran is incapable of sustaining a closed Strait of
Hormuz against a credible force.
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III. REACTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND GULF COOPERATION
COUNCIL TO IRAN'S MILITARY THREAT
A. OVERVIEW
This chapter focuses on the reactions of the United States and Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) toward Iran's growing military threat. The GCC includes Bahrain,
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. One intention of this
chapter is to show the increases in military strength, renewed security alliances, weapons
proliferation, and subsequent increases in military exercises by the U.S. and GCC, specific
to the Strait of Hormuz region. Iran's rearmament and potential threat has caused a
"spiraling" of weapons acquisitions between Iran and the GCC members. How capable is
the GCC in operating as a single military entity? Can the GCC defend itself from an
aggressive Iran while ensuring safe navigation throughout the Persian Gulf and Strait of
Hormuz? In this chapter, I examine the changes in military postures of the U.S. and GCC,
and assess the military capability of the Gulf organization. Iranian rearmament continues
to alter the defensive policies of the Persian Gulf community, and the result is a dangerous
arms race.
U.S. reactions to Iran include an increased military presence through deployed sea,
air, and land forces, prepositioned military weaponry, military financial aid, and increased
cooperation through training, combined exercises, and sustained operations. One
sustained operation includes the Maritime Interdiction Force Operations (MIFOPS)
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enforcing United Nations (UN) sanctions against Iraq. 48 Furthermore, with Iran adding a
sea asset focus as well as land and air, we can ask the question, what are the changes in
the U.S.'s posture to counter Iran? Finally, what can be said about the future of regional
security from a military perspective, and its relationship to U.S. interests?
Next, I have examined GCC reactions, specifically where considerable efforts have
been expended by member countries to build military strength. I have also looked at the
types of renewed and newly formed alliances.
B. UNITED STATES' REACTIONS
The United States has reacted militarily to the Iranian threat in a variety of ways.
Naval assets have been the preferred first deterrent to any regional unrest. The ongoing
deployment of ground and air forces to the area since the end of the Gulf War has
enhanced the joint military response. This cooperation allows the United States to
maintain a regional presence while projecting power. In order to sustain this presence,
especially in a time of fading defense budgets, increased requirements, and the necessity
for technologically advanced equipment, the United States has prepositioned military
equipment in theater. For those Gulf States involved, we have felt that the forward
staging of equipment has proved beneficial.
The prepositioning of military weapons and logistics permits the United States to
save money in transportation costs while incorporating a flexible arm toward
Tom Chamberlain, "Naval Forces and The Persian Gulf Challenges," Surface Warfare
22, no. 2 (March/April 1997): 4.
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requirements. Additionally, the materials are close to a somewhat volatile region, which
in return saves time if tensions erupt. For instance, consider the amount of equipment
shipped in the United States' preparation for Desert Storm. 50 We must realize that the
next conflict may not allow the U.S. six months to prepare. With key equipment onboard
a ship or in country, the U.S. needs only to transport manpower instead of a full
compliment of armament. Prepositioning equipment is efficient, reduces time constraints,
and frees up the resources for other foreign defense financial programs. The downside to
prepositioning is that normally the force needed for the upkeep of the equipment is
minimal, leaving the equipment vulnerable to an early attack by Precision Guided
Munitions (PGM), or sabotage. In addition, the equipment is left in an environment which
could result in corrosion. Finally, equipment not used is usually a cost to the U.S.
government
Financial programs benefit all six GCC members, and will be addressed later within
each country's synopsis. The most prominent program is the U.S. Foreign Military Sales
49
Robert James, "Beans to Bullets," Surface Warfare 22, no. 2 (March/April 1997): 24-
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James K. Matthews and Cora J. Holt, So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1996), 20. In preparation for war and sustainment there-
after, from August 1990 to March 1991, the U.S. shipped goods via sealift to the United
States Central Command (USCENTCOM) Area Of Responsibility (AOR). Of all supplies
moved by either airlift or sealift to the region, 94 percent was transported through sealift
totaling 9,151,538 tons, of which 96.5 percent was carried through the Strait of Hormuz.
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(FMS) agreements. 51 These programs provide a fair assessment of arms deals with
countries around the world. In addition, they provide a monetary figure for arms
delivered. Other programs include: Foreign Military Construction Sales (FMCS)
agreements; the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Program; commercial exports; the
Military Assistance Program (MAP) Merger Funds; the Military Assistance Program
(MAP); the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) Program; and the International Military
Education & Training (IMET) Program. Without fully discussing each program, it is
apparent that programs exist to assist countries in developing defensive structures.
Because the defensive structures of the Gulf states are generally weak, the U.S. is
helping to ma^tain regional security. Additionally, U.S. involvement has spread to the
training of Gulf militaries through combined exercises and even sustained operations, such
as Maritime Interdiction Force Operations (MIFOPS). The U.S. has been involved in
enforcing the United Nations (UN) sanctioned no-fly-zones over Iraq. Without a doubt,
these efforts display the United States' commitment to the Middle East region. Table 3-1
displays the current military relationships between the U.S. and the GCC.
Office of The Secretary of Defense, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military
Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts (Washington, DC: DSAA, September
30,1996).
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Bahrain Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Kuwait Yes 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Oman Yes Yes No No Yes
Qatar Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Saudi Arabia No Yes Yes Yes Yes
UAE Yes Yes Yes 2 Yes
Sources: Anthony Cordesman, U.S. Forces In The Middle East: Resources and Capabilities (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1997); Cordesman. Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, And The UAE: Challenges of
Security (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997); Ed Blanche, "Gulf navies look further offshore,"
Jane 's Navy International 102, no. 2 (March 1997); James Bruce, "GCC moves defense focus to its
navies," Jane's Intelligence Review 8, no. 11 (November 1996): 513-516.
' Also has agreements with Britain, France, Russia.
2 Space blank if information is unclear.
C. GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL'S REACTIONS
As previously discussed in Chapter II, Iran's initial stages of rebuilding began with
the Army and Air Force. These two branches received the heaviest losses during the war
with Iraq. Later, a widening in the rearmament program saw the acquisition of a Russian
Kilo (SS) class diesel-electric submarine and missile craft. Although the rearming
continues today from both Iranian and GCC perspectives, the GCC is incapable of
providing regional stability without U.S. participation as set forth in the principles of the
GCC organization.
Shortly following the start of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, the six Gulf states formed
the Gulf Cooperation Council. Though economic, social, and political aims exist, the main
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purpose of the council was the creation of a defensive military alliance. The GCC,
fearing an Iranian victory in the Iran-Iraq War, believed that a disruptive element of the
radical government would attempt to spread its Islamic revolution. Each GCC state then
enhanced its military defenses through purchases of modern aircraft, armored vehicles, air
defense systems, and missile-armed vessels. This acceleration of arms procurement
closely emulates the rearmament program launched by the Iranian military, even though
some Middle East reports suggest the arms campaign was initiated by the Gulf States. 53
Regardless of which country inaugurated the weapons race, the end result is a spiraling
effect in various military armaments. To some extent, rearmament has also exposed a
major weakness in the unity of the GCC.
To analyze the effectiveness of the GCC as a unified entity is difficult because of
the lack of cohesion and absence of interoperability between the member states. "The
GCC in no way is a dynamic organization such as, for example, a NATO . . . too many
political differences exist between the member countries which takes away from the
cooperation needed in an organization." 54 In addition, no exercises or regional military
cooperation have been observed outside of U.S. combined operations. One suggestion
regarding the union of the Gulf States is that the organization is purely rhetorical in nature,
52
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with the responsibility for military defense left to each country. This is evident in that U.S.
and other Western countries have operated in combined exercises with individual
members, but never on a grand scale of operations. 55 Additional support for individual
action is the fact that most of the countries continue to hold some type of irredentist claim
with their neighbors. Despite this current lack of unity, the GCC members as a group
continue to view Iraq and Iran as potential threats. 56
The absence of unity amongst the Gulf nations contributes to the lack of a credible
balance to the rising Iranian naval threat, specifically in the Strait of Hormuz region. Iran,
on the other hand, has completed several joint exercises, conducting large naval
operations that include small craft attacks and missile firings, coastal missile battery
firings, amphibious landings, submarine maneuvers, and simulated air strikes with attack
helicopters and strike fighters. The maneuvers, showcased to the region, display the
relative military strength of Iran. However, observing the GCC reaction to this threat, no
significant advancements in assets or capabilities are apparent. I suggest that Iran has the
advantage of military strength. The question remains, how did Iran achieve this edge over
the GCC?
5 Ed Blanche, 'Gulf navies look further offshore," Jane's Intelligence Review 102, no. 2
(March 1997): 23.
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The first answer lies in the conduct of Iran's exercises. The country has obtained a
level ofjointness amongst its military branches. All facets of the military have participated
in operations such as interdicting the Strait of Hormuz, and demonstrate a proficiency
which could successfully disrupt shipping traffic. Secondly, Iranian lines of
communication have achieved greater sophistication, to the point that better coordination
of assets is now possible. Increased coordination, also, generally allows for a better use of
forces within a region.
Perhaps the most important strength of the Iranian rearmament, and the fault
within the GCC, is that the Gulf organization has no real assets to balance Iran's
submarine threat. Iran's submarines, if properly used against an organization like that of
the GCC, could possibly operate autonomously without detection. Though the waters of
the Persian Gulf are too shallow to conduct any type of underwater warfare, the Strait of
Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman make the assets invaluable, especially for mine laying
operations. Table 3-2 displays the fact that no Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) assets
exist within the GCC organization. The lack of unity amongst the GCC could result in an
unsuccessful defense against an aggressive Iranian military, or an inability to counter
warlike actions against shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.
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Comparison of GCC and Iranian Naval Forces
Table 3-2
Type Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Arabia UAE Iran
Destroyer 2
Frigate 1 8 1 3
Corvette 2 1 2 2
Small craft 10 5 12 9 29 17 46
Mine War 7 7
Amphib 5 l 1 8 1 3 1 8
Submarine 3
Source: Graham E. Fuller and Bruce Pirnie, Iran: Destabilizing Potential in the Persian Gulf (Santa
Monica, California: RAND, 1996), 38; International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military
Balance, 1996/97 (London: IISS, 1996).
1
Craft Only.
The threat of Iran has lingered for almost a decade, but exactly how have the GCC
states countered the Islamic Republic's actions? Again the balancing has come from
individual member's actions instead of actions taken by a cooperative organization. Table
3-3 identifies known major acquisitions amongst the Gulf states.
Major Conventional Arms Orders & Deliveries:
As of 1996 1
Table 3-3






Helo Bo- 105 2 GE 1994 1995 Ex-Ge
MBT M-60A3 60 US 1995 1996 Ex-US from stock
in ROK; on Lease
SAM Improved
Hawk




M-578 6 US 3 1 Jan. 96 Unk Army, EDA2
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Frigate Perry Class 1 US 15 Feb. 96 Unk Navy; EDA
MRLS Loral Vought 151 US 10 May 96 Unk Army; $41 M, FMS3
Ammo All Types Alot us 1 1 Oct. 96 Unk Army; EDA
Kuwait
SAM Patriot 5 us 1992 Unk 5 batteries and 210
missiles
AD Radar Peaceshield 1 us 1991 1995
Helo UH-60L 16 us 1996 Unk Armed variant, bloc
by US Govt.
MBT M1A2 218 us 1992 1994 Deliveries continued
in 1996
AIFV MCV-80 254 UK 1993 1995 Deliveries continued
in 1996, 100
delivered by 1995
AIFV BMP-3 100 RF 1994 1995
SAM SA-18 30 RF 1994' 1995
FPC Combattante 8 Fr 1995 1999
Oman
MBT Challengerll 18 UK 1993 1995
MBT M60A3 50 us 1995 1996 Ex-US on lease
APC Piranha 80 UK 1993 1994 Final deliveries 1997
Arty G-5 155mm 25 RSA 1995 1996
AAA 35mm AA 4 Unk Unk 1996 4 batteries
Corvette VT-83 2 UK 1992 1996 Second delivery
1997
Machine Guns M85 100 US 17 May 96 Unk Army; EDA
A/C Bomb
Racks
Jaguar A/C 4 us 26 June 96 Unk Air Force; On-loan










12 Fr 1994 1997
FAC F/ta-class 4 UK 1992 1995 1/1995, 1/1996,
2/1997
FPC/M Barza-cX&ss 4 Fr 1993 1996 Deliveries 1996
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FGA F-15S 72 US 1992 1995 Deliveries until 2001
FGA Tornado IDS 48 UK 1993 1996 Deliveries until 1998
Trg Pckg Hawk 65 20 UK 1993 1996 Deliveries until 1997
Trg Pckg PC-9 20 UK 1993 1996 Deliveries in 1996
AD Radar Peaceshield 1 US 1991 1995
MBT M1A1 315 US 1990 1993 Final deliveries in
1995
MBT M1A3 150 US 1990 1994 Final deliveries in
1995
APC LAV 212 Ca Unk 1995 Part of order for
SNG
AIFV M-2 Bradley 400 US 1990 1993 Final deliveries in
1995
Arty 155mm Unk UK Unk Unk
FF Lafayette 2 Fr 1994 1998
FF F-2000 4 UK 1994 1996 Delivery in 1996
MCMV Sandown 4 UK 1988 1993 Final delivery 1995
Helo As-532 12 Fr 1996 Unk
Msl Upgrade Hawk Unk US 15 Apr. 96 Unk Army; $273 M,
FMS
Support Maint A/C; eng;
AGM; AAM
Unk US 15 Apr. 96 Unk Air Force; $ 100 M,
FMS
Surv. Upgrade Unk 2 A/C US 5 Sep. 96 Unk Air Force; $350 M,
FMS




Unk Unk us 26 Sep. 96 Unk Air Force; $2,500M,
FMS
UAE
Trg Hawk 26 UK 1989 1996 Deliveries began
1992
Helo AS-565 7 Fr 1995 1997
MBT Leclerc 396 Fr 1993 1994 Delivered in 1996
ARV Leclerc 46 Fr 1993 1995
AIFV BMP-3 330 RF 1992 1993 Delivered in 1995
FF Kortenaer 2 Nl 1996 1997 Ex-Nl; second
delivery in 1998
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Tpt Y-7 12 PRC 1996 1998 Deliveries to 2000
MBT T-72 RF 1995 Prototype Zufuqar 4
MBT T-72 70 PL Unk 1994 Deliveries to 1995
FAC Hegu-dass 10 PRC Unk 1995
SSM C-802 100 PRC Unk 1995 Anti-ship role
SS Kilo-class 3 RF Unk 1996 1 delivered in 1992,
1 in 1994, 1 in 1996
Mines MC-52 Unk PRC 1995 Unk
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance, 1996/97 (London: IISS,
1996), 125-27'; Arms Sales Monitor, no. 33, (Washington, DC: FASF, February 24,1997), 8-12.
1
List is not exclusive but includes confirmed transactions.
2
Excess Defense Article (EDA) transfers. The Pentagon is authorized to ship the items 15 or 30 days
after Congress is notified.
3
Foreign Military Sales Agreement
The second military reaction by the GCC members is entrance into security
arrangements with the United States. These arrangements, though politically flavored,
highlight a commitment to regional security, stability, and the interests of the United
States. These special arrangements are listed in the Gulf country reviews below. The
bilateral arrangements are important, particularly because they allow the U.S. to maintain
a presence in all facets of operations. In some cases, through negotiations in the
arrangements, governments allow the U.S. to forward deploy ground troops, preposition
equipment, use key shipping ports and airstrips, and construct Fleet Headquarters and
storage facilities. Secondly, the countries receive a measure of security, training on
advanced weapons, military financial aid including loans, and a U.S. commitment to the




Bahrain has maintained military ties with the U.S. since the departure of British
forces in 1971. Initially, the countries signed a land-lease agreement to support the
Middle East Forces (MEF). With this agreement, in addition to the Gulf War, the U.S.
furnished naval and air support during Operations Earnest Will and Praying Mantis.
On October 22, 1991, a ten year bilateral agreement was negotiated, expanding the
U.S. presence in Bahrain. Specifics within the agreement allow for an increase in joint
exercises, and prepositioning of war supplies. In July 1995, Bahrain allowed the U.S. to
create a headquarters for the FIFTH Fleet. In November 1995, Bahrain agreed to host 18
additional aircraft to fill the gap created by the absence of a U.S. carrier.
Bahrain has purchased large amounts of military equipment. Since 1988, the
purchases have amounted to $583.7 million in U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS).
Bahrain also received $416 thousand in grant aid during the period covering FY 1992 to
7 The number of exercises has risen from two before the Gulf War to eight a year.
8
Anthony H. Cordesman, U.S. Forces In The Middle East: Resources and Capabilities
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), 70.
All dollar amounts hereon derive from Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military
Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts (September 30,1996).
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Ibid., FMS agreements are defined as: the total value of defense articles and defense
services purchased with cash, credit, and Military Assistance Programs (MAP) Merger
Funds by a foreign government or international organization in any fiscal year.
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FY 1996, from the United States' International Military Education & Training (IMET)
Program.
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Bahrain cooperates with Saudi Arabia and is a strong supporter of the GCC.
Although Bahrain has purchased U.S. weaponry in the past, the country's military has
minimal interoperability with Saudi Arabian, Kuwaiti and U.S. military forces. In the area
of boundary disputes, Qatar and Bahrain have disagreements over territorial control on the
Hawar islands, the Fasht-e-Dibal reef, and the Jarada sandbar off Qatar's northwest coast.
This problem has kept Bahrain from achieving a greater role in the regional collective
security movement.
2. Kuwait
In the past, Kuwait maintained security through balancing the competing political
and military interests of its neighbors. However, the country's ships were reflagged by the
U.S. during the tanker war and relied heavily on a U.S. led Coalition force to drive Iraq
out of their territory.
Kuwait has signed security agreements with Britain, France, Russia, and the U.S.
The arrangement with the U.S. is a ten year bilateral agreement signed on September 19,
1 99 1
.
Similar to other security arrangements, it allows the use of facilities and ports by
Ibid., IMET is transferred in a dollar value allocated in any fiscal year for the training of
foreign military students both overseas and in the continental United States, and the cost
of training aids and materials associated with such training. The U.S. Government
receives no dollar reimbursement. This program is considered fully delivered when
funded.
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the U.S. military. In a telephone interview with the U.S. Department of State, an official,
who wished to remain anonymous, suggested that the security arrangements serve as a
foundation to counter Kuwait's most feared threat - Iraq. 62 Additionally, to offset the
accrued costs of maintaining a balancing force, the Kuwaiti government provides $35
million a year to the U.S. Since 1988, the country has purchased $3.9 billion in U.S.
Foreign Military Sales (FMS), of which $3.1 billion has been delivered.
Within the region, Kuwait maintains good relations with all of the southern Gulf
States but maintains its distance during disputes. The country is also a strong advocate of
GCC defense integration. Kuwaitis understand the difficulties and financial shortfalls of
accomplishing this task. 63
3. Oman
Oman's close cooperation with the U.S. extends to allowing the U.S. access to its
bases, and to prepositioning war materials. In addition, the two countries have conducted
exercises in Oman. Historically, the British government has worked closely with all
branches of the Omani defense, including air, naval, army, and anti-terrorists
organizations. France also has completed limited training of Omani officers.
62
U.S. Department of State official, telephone interview by author, October 9, 1997.
According to the source, "Iran is a secondary threat to Kuwait."
Cordesman, Kuwait: Recovery and Security After the Gulf War (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1997), 124.
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Oman has signed and renewed its military access agreement of July 1981, which
allows the U.S. to build containments, shelters, and other facilities, with all costs being
paid by the U.S. Oman has supported U.S. led initiatives for forward staging of air
reconnaissance and tankers.
Since Iran's rearmament, Oman has purchased $94.3 million worth of U.S. Foreign
Military Sales (FMS), and taken delivery on $82.5 million worth. Furthermore, Oman
received slightly over $1.0 million ofIMET military training assistance from the U.S. since
FY 1988. Many arms are British supplied, but the country lacks the financial resources to
purchase additional military armament.
As for relations with its Gulf neighbors, Oman has differences with Saudi Arabia
concerning territory and has accused the Saudis of attempting to dominate the GCC.
These shortcomings affect Oman's limited contributions to the Gulf Cooperation
Council's collective security arrangements.
4. Qatar
U.S. security relations with Qatar developed after the tanker war, and were later
revived prior to the Gulf War. Although tensions did develop over Qatar's purchase of
smuggled Stinger missiles from Afghanistan in 1988 to 1990, since that period relations
have improved. The country has permitted air units to stage during times of conflict and
during the operation of no-fly-zone sanctions over Iraq. On June 22, 1992, Qatar and the
U.S. negotiated a bilateral security arrangement allowing the use of both air and naval
facilities.
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Since the bilateral arrangement, countless exercises have been conducted with U.S.
forces. The arrangement allows prepositioning of heavy U.S. Army equipment and the
forward deployment of U.S. air units to fill any operational gap left by a carrier battle
group. In addition to the U.S. presence, France has a limited presence as well.
Qatar's defense consist largely of French equipment, resulting in limited operability
and sustainability with U.S. forces. Since the rearmament spiraling began, it has
purchased $6.9 million in U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and taken delivery on $3.96
million worth
Qatar's relations with the Gulf community are critical. As mentioned above, there
is an ongoing dispute with Bahrain. In addition, there is tension with Saudi Arabia and the




There is no formal security agreement, although the country holds close military
ties with the U.S. and has expanded U.S. access to Saudi air and seaports. Though there
is no formal agreement, Saudi Arabia did renew its U.S. Military Training Mission
Agreement with the U.S. in June 1992.
65
64 Cordesman, Saudi Arabia: Guarding The Desert Kingdom, 222-226.
65
Cordesman, U.S. Forces In The Middle East: Resources and Capabilities, 74-75.
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On a combined forces scale, the Royal government has cooperated closely with the
U.S. in setting up air and naval defenses against Iran beginning in 1983, when Iraq came
under serious military pressure from Iran. Both countries established the "Fahd Line,"
creating an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and forward air defensive system off
the Saudi coast. This defensive system supported Saudi Arabia in the shoot-down of an
Iranian F-4 testing the ADIZ on June 5,1984 66 Since then, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia
have jointly operated E-3A AWACS.
Since 1988, it has purchased $34.3 billion worth of U.S. Foreign Military Sales
(FMS), and taken delivery on $19.5 billion worth. Saudi weapons purchases have
increased both interoperability and sustainability with U.S. forces. In addition, the
purchases have reduced the unit cost per equipment purchased by U.S. forces. That is, the
U.S. and Saudi Arabia cooperatively purchase large amounts of armament together and
share in the lower unit prices given by the manufacturer.
Saudi Arabia maintains good relations with Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab
Emirates. However, the country has continued its territorial disputes with Oman and
Qatar
6. United Arab Emirates
The UAE negotiated a security arrangement with the U.S. in 1992 that offered the




Agreement on July 23, 1994. Conditions within the agreement permit the U.S. to
preposition navy equipment in Jebel Ali and in Fujirah
UAE forces have conducted combined air operations with the U.S. In addition,
the UAE deployed a squadron of fighter aircraft to Kuwait when Iraqi forces moved
toward the Kuwaiti border in October 1994. 67
The UAE has bought large amounts of U.S. equipment, including (I)HAWK
missiles and AH-64 Apache attack helicopters. Since 1988, UAE has purchased $1.1
billion worth of U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and taken delivery on nearly $1
billion worth. UAE forces have a wide range of equipment from multiple countries. One
(CO
reports suggest moderate interoperability and sustainability with U.S. forces. .
D. ANALYSIS
Some points of interest have risen regarding the arms race in the Middle East and
the capability of the GCC to defend itself and the Strait of Hormuz. First, the arms race
was initiated by Iran and the reactions by the U.S. have been more explicit than that of the
GCC. For instance, Iran continues to rebuild its Army and Air Force by acquiring tanks
and planes. The U.S. has reacted by prepositioning tanks, deploying air wings, increasing
its naval presence and integrating an air defense system. Subsequently, members within
67 Cordesman, Kuwait: Recovery and Security After the Gulf War, 127.
68
Cordesman, U.S. Forces In The Middle East: Resources and Capabilities, 77.
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the GCC have followed the U.S. lead and are acquiring their own planes, tanks and air
defense systems.
The next point of interest relates to the ease with which one can observe the
independent reactions of the countries that form the GCC, compared to observing the
GCC as a single entity. These observations focus mainly on a general lack of
interoperability, and the problems associated with a lack of cooperation resulting from the
ongoing territorial disputes between the member states. Most importantly, these factors
generally prevent any collective security amongst the members. In addition, the economic
downturns have precluded any massive military modernization. With these issues in mind,
the question of capability attracts attention.
A GCC force would require significant U.S. military assistance to defend the
sovereignty of the regional countries and the interests of the United States. The GCC
requires many technological advances to enable it to act as a sole entity. Those
technological advances should be in air defence radars, information operations, C4I and
ASW to name a few. In addition, the countries must learn to operate together. Table 3-4
below is an overall compilation of Gulf forces personnel, numbers of tanks, combat
aircraft and combat ships. The size of Iran's major capabilities is important when
compared with the Gulf States. If Iran and Iraq joined forces, which one expert believes is
an "inherent risk," then the Gulf States are grossly outmanned and out-tanked. 69 Further,
Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash States," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 2 (March/April
1994): 54.
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the GCC has only a few more combat aircraft and ships than a combined Iran and Iraq.
Although, the comparison may now weigh in favor of U.S. interests, in seven to eight
years the scale could favor those countries with interests different from the U.S.






Tanks Combat Aircraft 1 Combat Ships
Iran 513,000 1,440 304 56
Iraq 382,500 2,700 121 5
Total 895,500 4,140 425 61
Bahrain 11,000 106 48 10
Kuwait 15,300 215 92 2
Oman 43,500 91 46 13
Qatar 11,800 24 32 7
Saudi Arabia 162,500 1,055 336 37
UAE 64,500 201 141 20
Total GCC 308,600 1,692 695 89
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance, 1996/97 (London.
IISS, 1996).
' Includes armed helicopters when applicable.
2
Includes submarines when applicable.
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IV. VARYING LEVELS OF INTERDICTION
A. OVERVIEW
Within an aggressive rearmament program, Iran has taken extra steps towards
upgrading its military effectiveness, notably in the vicinity of the Strait of Hormuz. In this
chapter, I classify Iran's threat by translating it into an interdiction threat descriptive of
Iran's current military strength. I accomplish this by first examining the definition of
interdiction, and then introducing a four tiered model of interdiction levels. My model
provides a means to assess the current Iranian threat of closing the Strait of Hormuz.
B. INTERDICTION DEFINED
Iran has the capability to interdict the waterway; however, the concept of
interdiction may range from a mere "hail" to an aggressive hostile act, such as missile or
submerged mine attacks. In other words, interdiction can be broadly defined as the ways
by which disruptions in naval/maritime movements are accomplished. In Table 4-1, I
define varying levels of interdiction.
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Interdiction is defined in Webster's Dictionary (U.S.A.: Nickel Press, 1990), 229, as: in
ter diet v. To forbid or prohibit by official decree; In addition to the civilian usage of the
verb, the Department of Defense (DoD) definition is: An action to divert, disrupt, delay,
or destroy the enemy's surface military potential before it can be used effectively against







Four Tiers of Interdiction
Table 4-1
Objective Likelihood





movement in preparation for
conflict.
Outright closure and
sustained closure of the Strait.
Low cost operation, use
"vessels for hire"; only a short
term disruption.
Moderate risk involved; can
inflict substantial casualties to
adversary; repercussions may
be high.
Unable to sustain operation of
this magnitude; too costly on
political, military, and
economic scales
The lowest form of interdiction descriptive of the Iranian military is Threat
Interdiction (TI). Either implicit or explicit, TI describes the current Iranian initiative.
The implicit threat derives from U.S. observance of exercises, Iranian claims to new found
capabilities, or improvements in exercises. Iran's concept of operations is discussed
below, however, certain trends have been noted during numerous joint exercises. For
example, the joint exercises included live missile firings, special operations, and increased
coordination of forces.
Explicitly, threats rise as mere reactions to a U.S. presence. For example, when
Iraq was moving close to the Kuwaiti border in March 1995, U.S. officials saw a sizable
build-up of Iranian troops, artillery, and several missiles on islands within range of the
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Strait of Hormuz. It was thought to be a reaction by the Iranians to the increased U.S.
presence, thanks to Iraq's questionable movements. However, many experts believe that
Iran's moves were no threat to the security of the region. As stated by Professor
Anoushiravan Ehteshami from the University of Durham in England, "The Iranians' body
language is not at all threatening as far as western strategic interests are concerned."
x
In
essence, U.S. planners are merely overestimating the actual capability of the Iranian
forces. I suggest these actions of Iran are barely a threat and no more.
Another example is the rhetoric spoken by a senior Iranian official, following yet
another military exercise. His claim suggested that the exercise was "aimed at maintaining




in force strength and capabilities have kept Iran from pursuing new ventures in warfare.
In essence, the trends we see as U.S. planners are realistically those exercises to which
they are limited. Consequently, inspite of the constant rhetoric, I classify Iran's
capability as merely an exaggerated threat. "Threats from military leaders do not
necessarily hold the same credibility as threats from the upper echelons of government .
.
that's when the U.S. needs to worry." 74 So far, no government statements suggesting the
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Jonathan S. Landay, "Pentagon Puzzles Over Iran Buildup," Christian Science Monitor
10 (March 1995): 4.
72
"Amphibious forces tested," Jane 's Defense Weekly 24, no. 14 (October 7, 1995): 22.
73 Ed Blanche, "Iran able to close Strait of Hormuz, says general," Jane 's Defense Weekly
27, no. 18 (May 7, 1997): 18.
74
Gregory Giles, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), telephone
interview by author, September 23, 1997.
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closure of the Strait of Hormuz have been made. Hence, interdiction for purposes of
closing and sustaining the waterway is highly unlikely against a credible counterforce.
Harassment Interdiction (HI) ) is the second tier of the model. This type of
interdiction relates to hit-and-run tactics where the aggressor refrains from actually
meeting the adversary in a head-to-head confrontation. Iran does possess this capability.
I suggest this type of interdiction is low cost, and may result in a short term disruption of
traffic. For Iran, HI could achieve disruption for the low cost of the deploying mines from
a merchant ship or "vessel for hire." Though HI is meant to slow or disrupt incoming
traffic, this operation is short term as a result of detection by opposing forces, or the
movement of opposing forces into an area thus preventing further operations.
A scenario in which this type of interdiction could have possibly been utilized
derives from the events following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. In
preparation for war and support thereafter, from August 1990 to March 1991, the U.S.
shipped goods via sealift to the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) Area Of
Responsibility (AOR). Of all supplies moved by either airlift or sealift to the region, 94
percent was transported through sealift, totaling 9,151,538 tons, of which 96.5 percent
Graham H. Fuller and Bruce R. Pirnie, use the word "harass" as a label in defining an
operation against merchant and commercial fishing vessels of the Gulf. See, Iran:
Destabilizing Potential in the Persian Gulf, 5 1 . My use of "harassment" here describes a
level in which Iran pretends to or schedules forces that appear to be capable of an
aggressive interdiction operation.
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was carried through the Strait of Hormuz.
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Table 4-2 is a breakdown by month on the
amount of supplies shipped to the AOR in preparation for war.
Table 4-2














Gross tonnage is a combination of unit cargo, ammunition, petroleum, oil, and lubricants.
Source: James K. Matthews and Cora J. Holt, So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO,
September 1996), 13.
During the build-up period, a simple Iraqi merchant vessel for hire could have
placed mines in the Strait of Hormuz, adjacent shipping channels or around AI Jubayl and
Ad Damman, the two major Gulf ports of debarkation used by the coalition forces in
Saudi Arabia. This type of effort would have definitely slowed the entourage of U.S.
forces and supplies coming into the Persian Gulf. Additionally, the U.S. had no anti-mine
76
Matthews and Holt, So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast, 20.
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vessels in the region until October 1, 1990.
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Depending on the mined locations, the
potential use of mines would have "bottlenecked" shipping in the Gulf of Oman. The
amount of shipping through the Strait in preparation could have been disrupted for a
period of time, allowing Iraq to establish a firmer hold on its military positions, or
continue into Saudi Arabia if desired.
The next tier of the threat model is Vital or Strategic Interdiction (VSI), in which
a country may deny the usage of an international waterway to prevent an adversary's
refurbishment, ship movements, or reaching key positioning areas. I suggest the architects
of an interdictive attack benefit from the element of surprise. With the element of
surprise, high casualty rates are possible for those adversaries being denied the freedom of
passage. For example, when a Carrier Battle group is transiting the waterway, the vessel
is well inside a missile threat envelope throughout the transit, and thus a easy target.
However, the negative side to this threat level, at least for the initiators, is possible
repercussions. That is, should any U.S. vessel fall under attack, the U.S. is more than
likely prepared to counter attack with great force. The ultimate downfall is that the
expended resources used for upgrading the interdiction are likely to be destroyed.
Moreover, this type of interdiction is closely related to HI. The only difference is that the
VSI operation is more widespread and intense.
Ibid., 250; For a detailed chronology of force projection during Desert Shield/Desert
Storm, see Appendix 2 of Matthews and Holt, So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast, 1996.
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Closure Operations Interdiction (COI) is the ultimate denial of free navigation
through any waterway. This scenario prohibits the passage of all sea vessels due to
closure by military force. In this case, the Iranian Navy, in cooperation with the Iranian
Republican Guard Corps (IRGC), Army, and Air Force, secures the Strait of Hormuz to
all shipping. Tools of closure could consist of gunboats, land and ship-based missiles,
land-based artillery, submarines, moored and rocket propelled mines, and aircraft
including jet fighters, maritime patrol, and attack helicopters and special operations. How
does this form of interdiction apply to the Iranians? From a strategic planning perspective,
this application is a worst case scenario and requires a capability not only to initiate the
closure, but also to sustain the ongoing operation.
Iran's capabilities of operating at this level are twofold. First, given a scenario
where the GCC was forced to act without the assistance of the U.S. military, Iran could
probably close and sustain a closed Strait of Hormuz. Contributing factors to Iran's
possible success in this scenario are: the GCC's lack of interoperability; lack of training;
lack of a commonality in weapons systems; and unresolved issues between some of the
GCC members. Secondly, Iran is currently incapable of sustaining a closed waterway if
opposed by the U.S. The U.S. military capability still remains the dominant force within
the Gulf region which may overwhelm an Iranian attempt at closing the Strait
Three scales of influence come into affect in operations of this nature and may
conceivably prevent Iran from attempting to close the Strait. The first is political. Iran
falls likely prey to increases in sanctions, but may also feel outside pressures from its
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closest trading partners, on both the economic and defense scales. The second influence is
militarily related; the rearmament program in place lacks an adequate logistical build-up of
support equipment for Iran's naval forces. Furthermore, Iran has tended to acquire
sophisticated weapons systems which it can not support in terms of sustainment for a
prolonged period. The final influence is the economics of COI. Iran would essentially cut
off relations in the form of commerce, market exploitation, and the like. Today, the
Islamic Republic is submerged in high inflation, accrued debt, and outstanding loans, with
oil as its primary source of revenue. Attempting COI demolishes or retards any plans of
a national revival. Against the U.S. naval forces currently deployed, Iran is incapable of
sustaining a COI.
C. ANALYSIS
This study is not intended to downplay the Iranian threat to U.S. interests within
the region, but the U.S. must not forget the fact that we may not have six months of
military build-up before a war. As mentioned above, Iran could easily inflict damage to
U.S. troops and sailors in other than "head-to-head" conflicts. However, the current
Iranian ability to interdict the Strait of Hormuz in this study is classified at and limited to
the Threat Interdiction or (TI) level. That is, the country is only capable of rhetorically
threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz. The likelihood of Iran attempting to close the
Strait too costly an operation on both the military and political scales, and most
-70
Ahmad Ghoreishi and Dariush Zahedi, "Iran's SecurityConcerns in the Persian Gulf,"
Naval War College Review XLIV, no. 3 (summer 1996): 74-78.
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importantly on the economic scale. Iran's greatest revenue derives from oil sales. Oil




The Islamic Republic of Iran has strived to enhance the overall capability of its
forces adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz. The focus of this thesis remains on the ability to
act rather than the intention to attack. In the second chapter, I examined the current
Iranian military rearmament initiative and described an expanded focus that now includes
naval acquisitions of submarines, surface combatants, and technologically advanced
weapons systems including air and surface defense missiles. This broadening posed
numerous questions regarding announced threats and Iran's capability to sustain a closed
Strait of Hormuz. Moreover, considerations were given to maintenance practices,
financial resources, proficiency levels, and sustainment requirements in the overall
assessment of Iran's capability.
Following an examination of the Iranian military capability, I observed military
reactions by the United States and Gulf Cooperation Council to the Iranian rearmament. I
argued the fact that a spiraling effect in arms acquisitions has taken place between the
Persian Gulf states. Furthermore, the evidence suggests the Islamic Republic initiated the
race. A better understanding of GCC reactions was obtained by examining the members
independently than could be achieved by observing the GCC as an entity. I highlighted the
facts that a lack of cooperation and interoperability continues to divide the GCC countries.
These factors prevent any real collective security amongst the members and consequently
point to the necessity for U.S. assistance and leadership in regional activities. It is difficult
to envision a unified GCC by itself stopping or impeding a possible Iranian expansion.
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The term interdict was discussed and applied towards the current Iranian military
capability. I introduced several levels or categories of interdiction and placed the Iranian
capability into a threat level. Most importantly, this classification supports findings on
whether the Iranians actually possess the ability to close and sustain a closed Strait of
Hormuz.
The intent of this thesis is to shed light on the Iranian threat to U.S. interests
within the region and assesses the Iranian capability. Iran could easily inflict damages to
U.S. troops and sailors in other than "head-to-head" conflicts; however, the current
Iranian ability to interdict the Strait of Hormuz is classified at the Threat Interdiction or
(TI) level. That is, no evidence exists suggesting that the Iranians can sustain for a serious
length of time any closure operations on the waterway. Iran possesses the capability to
disrupt the flow of traffic through the Strait, but is incapable of sustaining a closed Strait
of Hormuz against a credible counterforce.
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